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ISSUES PRESENTED 
As framed by the United States District Court, the issues 
are as follows: 
(1) Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-38, [sic] et. seq., can a Jury 
apportion the fault of the plaintiff's 
employers that caused or contributed to the 
accident although said employers are lmmune 
from suit under Utah Worker's Compensation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. q 35-1-60 et. seq. 
(2) Under the utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code 
Ann. q 78-27-38, ~sic~ et. seq., can a Jury 
apportion the fault of an individual or entity 
that has been dismissed from the litigation but 
against whom it is claimed that they have 
caused or contributed to the accident. 
12],:TERI1J N AT IVE~STATUTF.S 
The trial court has requested this Court to interpret the 
Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 et. seq. 
Additionally, the provlslons of Utah Code Ann. qq 35-1-60 and 
35-1-62 are determinative. (Sullivan has reproduced the text of 
these statutes in Appendix A to this brief) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trackmobile erroneously equates "fault" to any act proxl-
~ately causlng lnJury. HOl,..;ever I the legislature specifically 
defined "fault" as an "actionable breach of legal duty, act, or 
omission." Since the legislature has abrogated any action by an 
employee against an enployer, an employer cannot be at "fault" 
under the Comparative Fault Act. Hence, the jury may not consider 
the enployers' acts ',.;hen allocating "fault." 
1 
since Sullivan's employers are by definition not at 
"fault" and there 1S nothing for the jury to compare, it really 
makes no difference whether the employers can be classified as 
"defendants" or "persons seeking recovery" under the act. Nonethe-
less, Trackmobile's efforts to so classify the employers are 
unavailing. The employers cannot be "defendants," since they are 
not "1 iable because of faul t. " They are not "persons seeking 
recovery," SInce Ranger Insurance Company (the subrogated CClrrler 
under worker's compensation law) is the trustee of Sullivan's CCluse 
of actIon. 
This Court's function .is to determine the legislClture's 
intent, not to second guess the legislature's wisdom. It makes no 
difference whether comparative causation may be consistent with the 
Worker's Compensation Act, feaSIble. ur in accord with decisions of 
other jurisdictions. 
tive. 
The legislature's formulation 1S determinCl-
The legislation is presumptively constitutional, and 
Trackmobile has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating the 
statute's unconstitutionality. The statute is not unconstitutional 
merely because it cured some, but not all, of the ills perceived in 
the previous comparative system. 
As a final matter, if the Court determ i nes that the 
statute is unconst i tutiona 1, Trackmobile is sub j eet to j oint and 
several liabilIty under prior law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY MCST APPORTION DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF 
"FAULT" RATHER THAN CAUSATION. 
A. Trackmobile Ignores the Legislature's Definition of "Fault." 
Trackmobile insists that the jury must consider the 
conduct of Sull ivan's employers in order to arr 1 ve at a correct 
apportionment of "fault." Although Trackmobile frequently uses the 
word "fault" ln its argument, it never expressly states what it 
means when it uses the term. Its arguments amply demonstrate, how-
ever, that it considers "fault" to include all conduct proximately 
causlng injury. While this may be one method for apportioning 
damages, it is not the method chosen by the Utah legislature. 
The legislature expressly defined "fault" in utah Code 
Ann. ~ 78 - 27 - 37 (2) (1 9 92) : 
"Fault" means any actionable breach of legal 
duty, act, or omission proximately causlng or 
contributing to injury or damages sustained by 
a person seeking recovery, including, but not 
limited to, negligence ln all its degrees, 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, 
strict liability, breach of express or implied 
warranty of a product, products liability, and 
misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
[Emphasis added.: 
Trackmobile apparently contends that the vwrd "actionable" modifies 
only the term "breach of legal duty" and that "fault" additionally 
includes iiIlL act or orcission proximately causing injury. HOh'ever! 
such a reading of the statute leads to a startling result--the 
impos i t ion of abso 1 ute 1 iab iii ty on "de f endants" whose conduct 
would have never been actionable under prior Utah law. Of course, 
there is simply no evidence that the Utah Legislature intended such 
a revolutionary result. 
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This Court has always held that a statute "will be gIven 
a reasonable and sensib Ie construct ion. " curtis v. Harmon Elec-
tronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978). The onl y reason-
able construction that can be given to the Comparative Fault Act is 
that the Jury is to apportion damages only among those parties 
whose breaches of legal duty, acts, or omissions <lre i'L<::lciol}a.ble. 
B. Neith"'-LJO.1l1li"/.,,n'.? Employers Nor Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Ra iJr:oad bre _il_t __ " F CD} tt_~_~~ 
1. !iull iVqn' s .. employers--conduct 
HQL_Clct.iol}_able. 
Sullivan's employers are at "fault" only if they commit-
ted an "act ionable" breach of legal duty, act or omISSIon which 
proximately caused injury. There was no actionable breach of leg<ll 
duty, act, or omission here. 
Utah Code Ann. § ]5-1-60 (1988). to which Trackmobile has 
referred, states in relevant part: 
Except 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title tor Injurles 
sustained by an employee shall be In 
place of ar'y and all other CiVIL liability 
Whatsoever, at common law or otherwise. 
for intentional torts, this statute abrogates "the 
enployee's comnon leiW right to sue the employer for any and <lll 
injuries suffered while in the course of his employment." Masich 
v. United states !3.nelting Refining & Mining Company, 191 P.2d 612, 
616, 111 Ut. 101 (1948); 1l1:yanv. Utah Tnternatior.lal, 531 P.2d 892 
(Utah 1975) Although Trackmobile insists that Sullivan's 
employers were negligent, the conduct IS not actionable under the 
4 
Worker's Compensation Act, and the Jury cannot consider the 
employers' conduct in the apportionment process. 
2. Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad--no breach of legal duty. 
The trial court has entered summary judgment dismissing 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad from this action, holding as 
a matter of law that it owed no duty to Sullivan in the circum-
stances of this case. Even though Trackmobile Clay contend that 
Denver and Rio Grande acted or failed to act and that the act or 
omission was a proximate cause of Sullivan's injuries, the fact 
that there was no actionable breach of legal duty precludes the 
attribution of "fault" to the railroad. 
J. Result not joint and several 
liability. 
Trackmobile errs when it asserts that omiSSion of 
Sullivan's employers fro", the verdict form results in joint and 
several liability. Trackmobile is but one of several defendants. 
If the acts or omiSSions of all constitute "fault," each of the 
defendants will pay daClages based on its proportionate share of 
that "fault." Sullivan '..;ill not be able to collect the entire 
aClount of his damages from anyone of these defendants unless the 
jury finds only one defendant at "fault." 
C. Sullivan's Employers Are Neither "Defendants" Nor "Persons 
Seeking Recovery" Under the Act. 
Since by definition Sullivan's employers cannot be at 
"fault," it is irrelevant '.,hether they are "defendants" or "persons 
5 
seeking recovery." Nevertheless, Trackmobile 1S in error when it 
argues that the employers fall in either category. 
1. Not "defendant,,",-~ 
Trackmobile maintains that Sullivan's employers are 
IIdefendants," because they are not l1immune from suit." Even assum-
ing i'lxguendo that Trackmobile is correct, the employers are st i 11 
not "defenddnts.1I 
utah Code Ann. ~ 78-27-37(1) (1992) defines the ten" 
"defendant" as follows: 
"Defendant" means any person not Immune from 
suit who 1S claimed to be liable_iJgcau.:?_e of 
fault to any person seeking recovery. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The definition has two elements. Even if the employers are not 
"immune from suit,1I they c("jnnot be "defendants" if they are not 
liable "because of fault.11 The employers' only liability to 
Sullivan 1S the payment of Worker's Compensation benefits, which 
liability an ses solely from the employment relationship. since 
the employers' liability is not based on "fault," the employer,; are 
not "defendants." 
Trackmobile asserts that Sullivan's employers are 
"persons seeking recovery 11 under the act. This argument has no 
basis in fact. \'Ihile it is true that an employer may l;Jg a trustee 
of the employee's cause of action against third parties under Iltah 
Code Ann. ~ 35-1-62 (1988), whether the employer 1_" actually the 
6 
trustee depends on the circumstances. The statute provides In 
relevant part: 
If compensation is claimed and the employer or 
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay 
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier 
shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and 
maintain the action either in its own name or 
In the name of the injured employee 
[Emphasis added.] 
Under the statute, the ent i ty who pays the benef its becomes the 
trustee of the cause of action. 
Mr. Sullivan testified in his deposition that he received 
"o'iorker's compensation bene fits through Ranger Insurance COr:1pany. 
(Sullivan Depo. pp. 185-187, Appendix B) As of Decerober 1990, 
Ranger Insurance Company had paid over $275,000 in benefits. 
(Ranger Insurance Coropany letter--Appendix C) Hence, the only 
persons seeking recovery here are Kenneth Sullivan and the 
insurance company. 
II. TRACKMOBILE INVITES THIS COURT TO IMPLEMENT A 
COMPARATIVE CACSATION SCHEME UNDER THE GUISE 
OF INTERPRETING THE COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT. 
Trackmobile has designed its arguments to persuade the 
Court that comparative causation is superior to comparative fault. 
First, it discusses the coropatibility of comparative causation with 
the purposes and language of the Worker's Compensation Act. 
Second, it cites Ctah cases interpreting the 197] Comparative 
Negligence Act, ~stensibly illustrating feasibility of the concept 
and highlighting the Court's prior concerns about fairness. Third, 
Tracknobile inplicitly refers to cases froC) other jurisdictions, 
implicitly arguing that "everybody else is doing it." However, the 
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issue 1S not whether it is possible to implement a comparative 
causation system or whether such a system lS desirable. This 
Court's duty is to effectuate the system the legislature chose to 
enact. 
A. The Utoh Cases Interpret Facets of the 1973 Utah comparative 
Negligence Act. 
Trackmobile cites the Court to Godesky v. Provo (ity 
Corp~., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984) and this Court's comment that the 
jury had apportioned negl igence among varlOUS ent i ties including 
the plaintiff's employer. Presumabl y, Trackmobile C 1 t es the case 
for the proposition that a jury is copilble of apportionlng respon-
sibility based on causatiorl. lIowever, feasib iIi ty is not. the issue 
here. 
Trackmob1le further directs the Court's attention to 
Bishgp v. Niele;.en, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 1')81) and Madsen v. Salt LaX" 
City School B<;>ord, 64" P.2d 658 (Utah 1982), both cases addressing 
contribution among tort-feasors. The considerations expressed In 
those cases have no relevance to the issues here. Under the 1973 
Utah Comparative Negligence Act, each defendant was jointly and 
severally liable to the plaintiff and wos entitled to contribution 
from other joint tort-feasors. Utah Code Ann. 'i~ 78-27-39 and 
78-27-41 (1973 Supp.) Since the tort-feasors 1n both Bishop and 
!-ladsen 'were jointly and severally liable to the respective plain-
tiffs, the focus of the Court's attentiun was fairness among Joint 
t.ort-feasors. However, considerations of fairness under the 
Comparative Fault Act relate to the allocations of risk between the 
injured plaintiff and "defendants" at "fault" for the injury. 
8 
------------- - --------_. 
Passage of the Utah Comparative Fault Act shifted 
significant risks from the tort-feasor to the injured plaintiff. 
Under the 1973 Comparative Negligence Act, a tort-feasor paid all 
of the plaintiffs' damages without being able to recoup the share 
of damages attributable to an impecunious joint tort-feasor or the 
plaintiff's employers. See Utah Code Ann. ~ 78-27-41(1) ( 1973 
Supp.), curtis Harmon Electronics. Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Ctah 1976), 
and Phillips v. Union.Pacific Railroad Company, 61~ P.2d 153 (Utah 
1980) . Now I because a "defendant" lS responsible to pay damages 
based only on it.s share of "fault," the injured plaintiff bears the 
risk of not obtaining full recovery due to a lIdefendant'sll 
impecunious. However, contrary to Trackmobile' s assertions, the 
legislature did not shift all of the burdens and rlsks to the 
plaintiff. "Defendants" roay still pay some damages for 1nJur1es 
proxiroately caused by parties who, by virtue of public policy, are 
immune from suitor whose acts do not constitute "fault." While 
Trackmobile undoubtedly believes that the legislature's allocation 
of risk 1S unfair, the allocation provides Trackmobile and other 
"defendants" significant benefits not provided by prior la·..;. 
B. Decisions Interpreting Other States' Statutes Have~Q.e_aring 
On Ctah's Comparative Fault Systero. 
Trackmobile cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions 
interpreting their respective statutes. Trackroobile candidly 
acknm-lledges that, "the ~anguage of the comparative fault acts in 
the other j urisd ictions 1S not ident ica 1 to Ctah' s Act." (Track-
:::obile's Brief, p. 19) These decisions interpreting unique 
statutes have no bearing on the interpretation of Ctah's statute. 
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In Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 
903 (Utah 1984), this Court addressed the applicability of the 
"unit rule" to the 197J Utah Comparative Negligence Act. The Court 
noted that at least one section of the act was identIcal to and had 
been borrowed from the State of Wisconsin. Nonetheless, the Court 
refused to adopt Wisconsin'S interpretation stating: 
The best evidence of the true intent and 
purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act 
is the plain language of the Act. 
cL",nsen, 679 P.2d at 906. If the Court is not bound by the deci-
slons of other jurisdictions interpreting statutes identical to 
Utah's statutes, it is obv lously not bound by decisions of state 
courts interpreting dissimilar statutes. The best evidence of the 
true intent of the Utah Legislature is the "plain language or the 
act" itself. 
III. TRACKMOBTLE'S CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IS 
FRIVOLOUS. 
A. :rhEe Court Need ._Not Cons ider Arguments . .Jvh ich. Ild\T£...Been Inade-
guatelY Briefed. 
This Court has previously observed that "all statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a statute 
bears the burden of proving its invalidity." 
Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). Trackmobile has 
utterly failed to carry its burden. 
In two brief paragraphs and without citation to any case 
Trackmobile asserts that the Utah Comparative Fault Act 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 2·. of the Utah Constitution. In an addi-
10 
tional two brief paragraphs with citation to only one case, 
Trackmobile claims that the ctah Comparative Fault Act violates 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
The entire constitutional discussion covers two double 
spaced pages, does not articulate the appl icable standards, and 
does not make an attempt to analyze the constitutional 1ssues 1n 
terms of the standards. In similar circumstances, the Ctah Court 
of Appeals refused to even consider the parties' contention: 
Appellants' brief contains less than a single 
page of assertions on this point and no cita-
tions to the record, no legal authorities and 
no analysis whatsoever. Their brief is not in 
compliance '..;i th our rules which requ1re the 
brief of the appellant to contain an argument. 
"The argument shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented with citations to the authori-
ties, statutes and part of the record relied 
on." Ctah R.App.P. 24(a)(9). Thus, '..;e decline 
to address th is issue and assune the correct-
ness of the judgnent belo'..;. [Citations 
omi tted. 1 
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah App. 1991) since 
Trackmobile has not presented an argument, the Court need not 
address this issue. 
B. A Statute Is Not Unconstitutional Merely Because It Does Not 
Rectify All Perceived Ills. 
As discussed 1n Peint II, the Comparative Fault Act 
shifted some but not all risks to the plaintiff. However, the utah 
Comparative Fault Act is not unconstitutional by mere virtue of the 
fact that the legislature did not address all inequities perceived 
by Trackmobile 1n the 1973 legislation. This Court recently 
stated: 
11 
In determining constitutionality, courts are 
guided by the familiar principles that a 
"statute is not invalid under the Consti-
tution because it might have gone further 
than it did," that a legislature need not 
"strike dt all evils at the same time," 
and that "reform may take one step at a 
time, addressing itself to the phase of 
the problem which seems most acute to the 
legislative mind." [Citations omitted.] 
§.reenwood v. City of North Salt Lakg, 817 P.2d 816, 821 (Utah 
1991) . 
IV. I F THE UTAH COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIClNAL, TRACKMOBILE AND THE 
REMAINDER OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION 
ARE SUBJECT TO JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY. 
The Utah Comparative Fault Act expressly repealed the 
Utah ComparaUve Negligence Act of 1973, including Utah Code Ann. 
~ 78-27-41 (1) (1973 Supp.) · .... hich preserved the common law doctrine 
of joint and several liability. If, indeed, the Utah Comparative 
Faul t A.ct 1S unconsti tutional, the repealer 1S ineffective, and 
Trackmobile and its co-defendants are subject to joint and several 
liability under pr10r law. See Board of Education of Ogden City v. 
Hunter, 159 P. 1019, 48 ut. 373 (1916), i?tilJ:~ .. v,. Barker, 167 P. 
262, 50 Ut. 189 (1917), and In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1378 fn. 14 
(Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Comparative Fault Act. 1S premised on "fault." 
Al though Trilckmobile would have the Court interpret the act as 
being nothing more thiln a comparative causation scheme, the Utah 
Legislature's express ldnguage repudiates such a contention and the 
12 
Court is bound to enforce the statute as written. Tracknobile has 
failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the Conparative 
Fault Act is unconstitutional. However, if the legislation lS 
unconstitutional, Trackmobile and its co-defendants are subject to 
joint and several liability. 
DATED this day of May, 1992. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By 
L. Rich Humpherys 
M. Douglas Bayly 
Attorneys for Kenneth Sullivan 
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APPENDIX A 
Utah Comparative Fault Act 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 et. seq. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-60 and 35-1-62 
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78-27-35 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-27-35_ Release, settlement, or statement by injured per-
son - Notice of rescission or disavowaL 
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement. if given by mail. is 
given when it is deposited in a mailbox , properly addressed with postage 
prepaid . Notice of cancella tion given by the injured person need not take a 
particular form and is sufficien t if it indicates by any form of written expres-
sion the intention of t he injured perso n not to be bound by the settlement 
agreement, liability release, or disavowed statement. 
History, L. 1973. ch. 208, § 4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am . JUT. 2d. - 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release § 14 
et seq. 
C.J.S. - 76 C.J.S. Release § 38 et seq. 
78·27·36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, set· 
tlement, or statement by injured person in addi· 
tion to other provisions. 
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to. and not in 
lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise 
existing in the law. 
History: L. 1973. ch. 208. § 5. 
Meaning o f " this act," - See note follow-
ing same catchline ' in notes to § 78·27·32. 
78·27·37. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) uDefendant" means any person not immune from suit who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach oflegal duty, act, or om ission 
proxima tely causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
perso n seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in . all 
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of ri sk . strict liability, 
breach of expr ess or implied warranty of a product, products liabil ity , and 
misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "P erson seek ing recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own beha lf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representa tive. 
His tory: C. 1953. 78-27-37, e nacted by L. 
1986. ch. \99, ! t. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986 , 
ch. 1989, § 1 repea ls former 9 78-27-37, as en· 
acted by Laws 1973. ch. 209, § 1. relating t ' 
dimini shment of damages and assumption of 
ri sk, and reenacts the abo ve section. 
430 
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27 -38 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank. 
746 P.2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. - For 
comment, "The Liability Reform Act: An Ap-
proach to Equitable Application," see 13 J . 
Con temp. L. 89 (1987 ). 
A.L.R. - Liability to one struck by golf ball . 
53 A.L.R.4th 282. 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that 
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to 
that defendant. 
His tory: C. 1953, 78·27·38. enacted by L. 
1986. ch. 199. § 2. 
Repeals and Reenactme nts. - Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 2 repeals fo rmer § 78-27-38. as en-
acted by Laws 1973. ch. 209. § 2, relating to 
special verdicts. and reenacts the above sec-
tion . 
Cross-References. - Product Liability Act, 
man ufacturer or seller not liable if alterat ion 
or modification of product after sale is substan-
tial contributing cause of injury. ~ 78-15-5. 
Skiers not to make claim against or recover 
from ski area operator fo r injury resul t ing from 
any inhe rent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSTS 
Assumption of risk . 
Bailment. 
Causation. 
Dramshops. 
Jury instructions. 
Last clear chance. 
Open and obvious danger. 
Uni t method of determining negligence, 
Wrongful death. 
Cit.ed, 
Assumption of risk. 
"Assumption of r isk," Le_, risk of a known 
danger voluntarily assumed. may amount to a 
lack of due care const.ituting negligence; where 
such is the case and the party assuming the 
risk is the plaintiff in an act.ion governed by 
comparative negligence statute. he is charge-
able with contributory negligence and is liable 
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accor-
dance with its provisions. Rigtrup v. Straw-
berry Water Users Ass'n. 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
1977), overruled on other grounds. Moore v. 
Burton Lumber & Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865 
(Uta h 1981). 
Assumption of risk language is not appropri-
ate to describe the various concepts previously 
dealt with under that terminology but is to be 
treated. in its secondary sense, as cont r ibutory 
negligence; when the issue is rai sed anention 
shou ld be focused on whether a reasonably pru-
dent man in the exercise of due care would 
have incurred the risk, despite hi s knowledge 
of it. and if so. whether he would have con-
ducted himself in the manner in which the per-
son seek ing to recover acted in light of all the 
surroundmg circumstances. Including the ap-
preciated risk ; then. if the unreasonableness of 
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be 
less than that of the person from whom recov-
ery is sought, any damages allowed should be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of neg-
ligence attributable to the person recove r ing . 
Jacobsen Constr . Co. v. StruclO- Lite Eng'g, 
Inc .. 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980l. 
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk" 
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a 
known danger. Moo re v, Burton Lumber & 
Hdwe. Co .. 631 P.2d 865 {Utah 1981 l. 
Assumption of ri sk language is not appropri-
ate in an instruction under comparative negli-
gence statutes. Stephens v. Henderson. 7-11 
P .2d 952 (Utah 1987) tapplying s tatute in ef-
fect pr ior to 1986). 
The assumption of ri sk doctrine has been ex-
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;!lSCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27 -39 
Brigham Young , Law Review. - The 
Merger of ~.om~aratlve Fault P.rincipies with 
Strict Liability In Utah: Mulherin v. Ingersoll-
!/snd Co .. 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev . 964. 966. 
. Damage Apportionment in Accounting Mal· 
practice Actions: The Role of Compara tive 
Faull, 1990 B.Y.U.L. Rev . 949. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. - For 
comment. "The Liability Reform Act: An Ap-
proach to Equitable Application." 13 J . 
Contemp. L. 89 (1987), 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 578 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence 
§ 1128 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 65A C.J.S. Negligence ~ 169 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. - Comparative negligence rule 
where misconduct of three or more persons is 
involved. 8 A.L.R.3d 722. 
Retrospective application of state statute 
substituting rule of comparative negligence for 
that of contributory neglige nce. 37 A.L.R.3d 
1438. 
Indemnity or contribution between joint tort-
ieasors on basis of relative fau lt. 53 A.L.R3d 
184. 
Modem development of comparative negli-
gence doctrine having applicabili ty to negli-
J;ence actions generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339. 
Application of comparative negligence doc-
trine, generally. 86 A.L.R.3d 1206, 
Comparative negligenc~ doctrine applied to 
actio ns based on strict liability in tort. 9 
A.L.R.4lh 633. 
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence 
rul es on assumption of risk and contribu tory 
negligence. 16 A.L.R.4th 700. 
Commercia l rente r's neglige nce liability for 
customer 's personal injuries . 57 A. L.R.4th 
11 86. 
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63 
A.L.R.4lh 221. 
Liability for injury incurred in operation of 
power golf cart. 66 A.L.R.4lh 622. 
'fort liabili ty for window washer's injury or 
death. 69 A.L.R.4th 207. 
Comparative fault: calculation of net recov · 
ery by applying percentage of plaintifTs fault 
before or after subtracting amount of se ttle-
ment by less than all joint tortfeasors, 71 
A.L.R,4lh 1108. 
Rescue doctrine: applicability and applica · 
tion of comparative negligence principles. 75 
A.L.R,4lh 875. 
Key Numbers. - Negligence G=> 97 et seq. 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and 
proportion of fault. 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, 
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of dam-
ages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each 
person seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27·39. e nacted by L. 
1986. ch. 199. § 3. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986. 
ch. 199. ~ 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-
acted by Laws 1973. ch. 209. ~ 3, relating to 
contribution among joint tortieasors. a nd reen· 
acts the above section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Jury instructions. 
Cited. 
ANALYSIS 
Jury instructions. 
If requested. a trial court must inform the 
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning 
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it 
finds in a comparati ve neglige nce case. if the 
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
fuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart. 658 
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
Cited in Reeves v. Genti le, 813 P.2d 111 
(Utah 1991). 
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78-27 -40 .JUDICIAL CODE 
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault 
- No contribution. 
Subject to Section 78,27,38, the maximum amount for which a defendant 
may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion 
of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other 
person. 
History: C. 1953, 78·27-40, enacted by L. 
1986. c h. 199, § 4. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986, 
ch. 199. § 4 repeals fo rmer q 78-27-40, as en-
acted by Laws 1973. ch. 209. ~ 4. relatin~ to 
settlement by a joint tortfeasor. and reenacts 
the above section. 
Cross-References. - Enforcement of con· 
tribution and rei mbursement, Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 69( hL 
Joint obligations. ~ 15-4-1 e t seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section. 
Indemnitv contract. 
Plaintifr~ minor ch ild as joint tortfeasor. 
Workers' compensation. 
Cited . 
Applicability of section. 
A statute. such as this section. eliminating 
joint and several liabili ty may not be applied to 
inj uries occurring prior to its effective date. 
Where the inj uries occurred on Novembe r 8. 
1984. and t he Liability Reform Act was not 
effect ive until April 28. 1986. the tria l court 
was correct in holding that the Liability Re· 
fo rm Ac t did not a pply . Stephens v. Henderson. 
741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987). 
Indemnity contract. 
The former comparative neg ligence prov i· 
sions d id not in va lidate an employe r's indem· 
nity contract with a third party whe reby em· 
player agreed to indemnify the t hird party 
agai nst claims aris ing out of injuries to the em· 
ployer's employees. Shell Oil Co. v. 
Brinkerhoff·Signal Dnlling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1983). 
Plaintiffs minor child as jo int tonfeasor. 
Where plaintiff was awarded a judgment In 
action aga ins t a defendant to recover the prop-
erty loss susta ined as the result of a collision 
between a utomobi les operated by defendant 
and the minor unemancipated daughter of the 
plaintiff. and where the da ughter'S negligence 
contributed to the property loss sustained by 
her fathe r. the minor daughter was a joi nt tort· 
feasor and li able to lhe defenda nt fo r contribu-
tion. Bishop v. N ielsen. 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 
19811. 
Workers ' compe nsation. 
Em ployer cannOl be a joint tonfeasor as to 
an injury to his employee covered by the Work· 
men 's Compensation Act. Curti s v. Harmon 
Elec .. Inc .. 552 P.2d 117 lUtah 19i6): Phill ips 
v. Union Pac. R.R.. 6 1-1, P.2d 153 (L" tah 1980\. 
Cited in Warren v. Honda Motor Co .. 669 F. 
S upp. 365 iD. Utah 1987), 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. - Utah AI· 
lows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De· 
spite Immunity from Direct Sui t: Bishop v. 
Nielsen. 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 429. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Com· 
ment. The Liability Reform Act: An Approach 
t r '<.:quitable Application , 13 J . Con temp. L. 89 
(1987). 
A.L.R. - Ri ght of tortfeasor initially caus-
ing injury to recover indemnity or contribution 
from medical attendant aggravating injury or 
t:ausin~ new injury in course of t reatment, 72 
A.L.RAth 23l. 
Products liability: se ller's right to indemnity 
from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278. 
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MISC ELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27 -43 
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation , 
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of havin g 
determined their respective proportions of fault. . 
History: C. 1953.78·27·41, enacted by L. 
1986 . ch. 199. ! 5. 
Repeals and Reenactme nts. - Laws 1986. 
ch. 199. § 5 repeals former * 78-27.41. as en-
acted by Laws 1973. ch. 209. § 5, relating: to 
rights of contribution and indemnity. and reen· 
acts the above section . 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Products liability: seiter 's right to 
indemnity from manufacturer. 79 A.L.R.4th 
278. 
78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge 
other defendants. 
A release given by a person seeki ng recovery to one or more defendants does 
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
History: C. 1953. 78-27-42, enacted by L. 
1986. ch. 199. ; 6. 
Repea ls and Reenactments. - Laws 1986. 
eh. 199 . S 6 repeals former S 78·27-42, as ~n-
acted by Laws 1973. eh. 209, * 6, relating to 
release of joint tonfeasors a nd a reduction of 
claim. and reenacts the above section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release * 35 
et seq. 
C.J.S. - i6 C.J.S . Release § 38 eL seq. 
A.L.R. - Tortfeasor's general release of co· 
tort feasor as affecting former 's ri ght of contri -
bution against cotortfeaso r. 34 A.L.R.3d 137-i . 
Release of one respons ible for injury as af· 
fecting liability of physicia n or surgeon tor 
negligent treatment of injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 260. 
Voluntary payment into court of judgment 
agai nst one joint tort feasor as release of others, 
40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
Release of one neg ligently treating injury a:; 
affecting liability of one originall y respons ible 
for injury , 64 A.L.R.3d 839. 
Validity and elfect of agreement with one 
cotortfeasor se tting aside his maXLmum Iiauil -
ity a nd providmg for reduction or extingui sh-
ment thereof relative to recove ry against non· 
agreei ng cOlortfeasor, 65 A.L.R.3d 602. 
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem-
nity, contribution. 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 afTects or impairs any com-
mon law or statutory immunity from liability. including. but not limited to. 
governmental immunity as provided in Title 63 , Chapter 30, and the exclu-
sive remedy provi sions of Title 35, Chapter l. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 
through 78-27-42 afTects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution 
arising from statute, contract, or agreement. 
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35-1-60 · .A BOR - IN DUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
c:OTES TO DECIS IO NS 
~-.,rotke and opportunity to be heard. 
This sPoction inferentmll y at lea::;t provides 
tha t the commiss ion shall gi ve noti ce and an 
opportunity to be heard to a ll persons whose 
ri ghts may be affected by its awa rd. Therefore, 
commission. whose award has been a nnu lled. 
c~ nnot amend its findings of facts without giv-
ing employer notice a nd a n oppor tuni ty to be 
hea rd. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Indus tri a l 
Comm'n, 74 Utah 3 16, 279 P. 612 (1929) . 
COLLAT ERAL RE~-ERENCES 
C.J .S. - 100 C.J.S. Workme n's Compensa- I(ey Numbers. - Workers' Compensation 
tion § 638. G=> \765. 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or emolOyee - Occupational disease ex-
centeri. 
The ri ght to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
inj uries sus tained by a n employee, whether r esulting in death or not, shall be 
the exciusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
""ainst any odicer. agent or employee of t he employer a nd the liabil it ies of 
cile emp lOyer Imposed by this act sha ll be in place of any and a ll other civil 
liabi li ty whatsoever, a t common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
:-:?ouse. widow, children, parents, dependents. next of kin, heirs. personal rep-
resenta tives, guardian , or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracteu, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent. injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent a n employee (or his dependents) fro m filing a claim with the indus-
triai commi::.ision of Utah for compensation in t hose cases within the provi-
sions of the Utah Occupational Diseatie Disability Act, as amended. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100. ~ 76; C.L. 1917. 
! 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, * 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943. 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, ! l. 
Cross-References. - Employment of chi l-
dren, ~ 34-23-1 et seq. 
Utah Occupational Disease Disab ili ty Law, 
§ 35-2-1 et seq. 
Meaning of " this act". - See the note un· 
der the same catchline following § 35-1-46. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Compulsory. 
Effect of no-fa ult insurance. 
Employe r. 
Exclusiveness of remedy. 
- Minor engaged in hazardous employment. 
Fa rmers a nd domestics. 
Hospital cha rges. 
Inde mnification agreement het\\ etm employer a nd th ird pa rty. 
Indemnity agreement. 
Intentional tort. 
Join t venture. 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-60 
~;u bllity to th ird parties. 
:! lure nnd adequacy of act. 
<:giigenl injury by employee of same employe r. 
>~cllDatlOnai di sease. 
;~3 tulOrv e mployer . 
- "Sufficient control. " 
' !Ibcontracto r's employee. 
;nrt liability of employer. 
-" [) nal C:lpac ilY" doctrine. 
,·i ted. 
:;ompw sory. 
Utah Workme n's Compensation Act is com-
mlsory and not elective. Lovato v. Beatrice 
7 oods , 22 Utah 2d 371, 453 P.2d 692 (1969). 
~ffcct OJ" no- fa u l t ins ura n ce_ 
: 'he ~..,r o-Fault Insurance Act, former 
3 1-41 · 1 et seq .. did not s upersede or nullify 
_~ H:! Workmen's Compensation Act's exclusive 
"~ meci v p,ov is ion as applied to injuries from 
;:-:otor venicie accidents sutTered in the course 
fi t' employment. IML Fre ight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 
' 38 P.2d 296 \ Utah 1975). 
S mployer. 
t.Vorker was employee of cable television 
"ompany , ils subsid iary, and its limiled part· 
ner for purposes of the exclusive remedy provi-
s ions of t he Utah Workmen 's Compensation 
Act where the cable televisio n company, as 
part or its management style, grouped all em-
ployees together under its direct control and 
whe re the worker's time sheets and checks . 
we re managed by the cable televi sion com-
pany. Freund v. Uta h Power & Light, 625 F. 
>3upp. 272 (D. Utah 1985). 
~xclusiveness of remedy. 
Under this section whe n the injury is caused 
by the negligent act of the employer, no willful 
misconduct be ing claimed, the inju red em-
ployee or , when the injury causes death, his 
dependents, must be content to accept the com-
pensation provided by t he act. Ha lli ng v. In-
dustria l Comm'n. 71 Uta h 112, 263 P. 78 
(1927). 
Since th e enactment of the Workmen 's Com-
pensation Act in 19 17 , the exclus ive remedy of 
an employee who is inju red in the course of' his 
employment is t he right to recover the compen-
satio n provided fo r in the act (9 35-1-1 et seq.). 
Murray v. Wasa tch Grad ing Co .. 73 Utah 430. 
274 P. 940 (1929); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet 
Was h Laundry, 108 Uta h 1, 156 P.2d 885 
(19451. 
Employee of railroad was not precluded from 
fi ling claim fo r compensation by applicat ion 
filed under Federal Employers' Liability Act 
on ground of e lection si nce emplo) ee did not 
have two remed ies but only one; if inj ury was 
incu rred while he was engaged in interstate 
commerce. his remedy was under Federal E m-
ploye rs' Liab ility Act and if not. it was under 
s tate act. Utah Idaho Cent. RR v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 84 Utah 364. 35 P.2d 842, 94 A L.R. 
1423 (19341. 
This section abrogates employee's common-
law right to s ue employer for injuries suffered 
while in course of employment. except where 
employer is not subject to this act or common· 
law remedy of employee is expressly rese rved. 
~'lasich v. United States Smeltin£!. Re f. & filin-
ing Co., 113 Utah 101. 191 P.2d 612. appeal 
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138. 93 L. 
Ed. 4ll (1948 ). 
This section makes it clear that this chapter 
is the exclus ive vehicle for recov ery of co mpen-
sation for injury or death, against the employe r 
and other employees to the exclusion of any 
and a ll other civil liability whatsover, at co m-
mon law or otherwise, and that i t bars all next 
uf kin or dependents . or anyone else, from 
using any other means of recovery against em-
ployers and others named in a nd covered by 
the Act, than the Act itself. !\torrill v. J & M 
Cons tr. Co .. 635 P .2d 88 (utah 1981 1. 
- Min o r e n gaged in haza rdo u s e m ploy-
m e n t. 
Even if a minor employee is inj ured while 
engaged in hazardous employmem in violation 
of * 34-23-2. prohibiting the e mployment of 
minors in hazardous occupations , the minor's 
exclusive remedy is th rough this chapter. and 
the minor cannot vo id her employment con-
tract and ti ue in tort. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp .. 
707 P.2d 678 IUtah 1985). 
Farm e r s and do mestics. 
Farm laborers and domestic s~rvanls . in the 
event of an accident or injury. are entitled to 
pursue thei r common-law remedies in a n ac -
tion agains t the employer becaul:ie they a re ex-
cepted from the act by §§ 35·1 ·42 and 35-1-43. 
Mu rray v. Str ike. 76 Utah 118. 287 P . 92:2 
(1930). 
Hospital c ha r ges. 
The on ly power given the Industrial Com-
missio n by the workers' compensation s tatutes 
over hospital cha rges for se rvices rendered to 
injured employees is the right to refuse to pay 
that par t of them which is excessive in amount 
or for care which was not reaso nably neces-
sary; Ind ustr ial Commission does not have the 
power and authori ty to se t maximum rates 
191 
I ~ 
t 
: I 
" I , , 
, 
, 
l 
~ . 
!l , 
" , , 
d 
! I 
" 
I , 
I I, 
, ! 
I' 
35-1-60 LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMM ISSION 
which hospita ls may cha rge for serv ices ren-
dered injured employees, and hospitals are nn t 
prohib ited from holding an injured employee 
liab le fo r any amounts not paid by the com mis-
s ion. Intermounta in Health Care, Inc. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1289 (Utah 19821. 
lndemnification agreement between e m· 
p loyer and third party. 
Where employer and third party voluntarily 
enter into a written Indemnification agree-
ment whereby the employer agrees to indem-
nify the thi rd party against claims arising out 
of injuries to the employer 's employees, and 
where a n empioyee is injured and is compen-
sated by the employer in accordance with the 
',vorke rs' comnensation law. Lhe exclusive rem-
edy provision' of t his section does not. preclude 
t he enforcement of the indemnification agree-
ment by the thi rd party agai nst t.he employer 
fo r amounts paid by the third party to the em-
?loyee as a resuit of the injury. Shell Oil Co. v. 
'Jrin kerhotf-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 
IUtah 19831. 
Indemnity aweement. 
"1 'demnity agreement is a separate un-
de rt ak mg by the employer that will be enforce-
Ihie d.p:' pit.e workers' compensation if t he in -
:bmmtv provision expressly covers t ho indem-
:'. ltor 5 '-lmp loyees, but the phrase "person or 
Il~ r~cns ' does not cover indemnitor's own em-
:! if)vee~ given the dramat.ic consequences of 
:; u..:!l ..In interpret.ation. Wollam v. Kennecott 
Corp .. 663 F. Supp. 268 10. Utah (987). 
; n tentiona i tOrt. 
Provision prohibiting action for damaq'es 
against fellow employee does not prohibit 
maintenance of action for premeditated and in-
tentional act of fellow empluyee. Bryan v. Utah 
Int'!, 533 P .2d 892 IUtah (975). 
Joint venture. 
Construction company obtained contract to 
construct diversion tunnel a t dam and entered 
into agreeme nt with corporation by which the 
two organizations would unite the ir efforts to 
complete s uch co ns truction a nd share in profits 
or losses from the enterprise. Miner, hired by 
t he const.ruction company, who was injured 
while working on the tunnel and who obtained 
workmen's compensation benefi ts, could not 
sue corporation for alleged negligence of co rpo-
rate employees since the two companies were 
regarded as the employing unit. The employees 
of both companies were engaged in the same 
employment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 
Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (19631.. 
This section ba rred suit by workmen against 
joint venturer which was his employer for inju-
ries sustained in use of mach ine furnished by a 
second joint venturer, whe re machine was fur-
n ished pursuant to contract creatinq' t.he join t 
ven ture . Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co .. ~9 
Utah 2d 415. 510 P.2d ll04 119731. 
LinbiHty to third parties. 
Where plaintiff employee was in.iu red when 
a fellow employee drove the truck in which 
t.hey were ri di ng into the side of a t rain, and 
brought an acbion a~ainst the radroad a nd the 
man ufacturer of the crossing signai. allegi ng 
ne~ligent upkeep and product defect. resoec-
tiveiy, neither defendant could join plaintiffs 
employe r as a third-party defendant in order to 
assert a claim for con tribution li'om it under 
the joint tort-feasor statute. Curtis v. Harmon 
Elec., [nc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976): Phillios 
v. Union Pac. R.R .. 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 19 '0) 
(decided under prior law). 
Nature a nd adequacy o f act. 
The workers' compensation scheme IS purely 
statutory, and the act \~ 35-1-1 et sell .' pro-
vides a plain, s peedy, and adequate method of 
review. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm'n. 7-1 
Utah 309. 279 P. 6U9 119291.. 
Negligent injury by e mployee of same e m-
ployer, 
Where s ubcontractor was a n "employee" o/" 
contractor, other employee of contractor could 
not maintain negligence action against subcon-
tractOr but must look to workers' compen~ation 
insu rance . Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 
139. 442 P.2d 31 119681.. 
Occupationa l disease, 
Administratrix of deceased city employee, 
who died from inha lation of paint. he was or-
dered to s pray on t rucks, could bring an acuon 
a t law a~ainst the employer, smce !Such was 
not a ll accidental injury co mpe nsable under 
this act (~ 35-1-1 et seq.) , but was an "occupa-
tional di sease." Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 
Utah 123 , 90 P.2d 174 ( l939). 
S ta tutory e mployer . 
- "Sufficient control." 
Where join t owners of inte rests in uil and gas 
lease~ provideJ for construction of u g-as pro· 
cessing plant located in Utah, to be operated as 
a "mutually profitable venture" for the purpose 
of extracting liquid hydroca rbons, and under 
the operating agreement the uwners rese rved 
the power of ultimate control ove r the project 
and over the operato r thereof, the owners re-
tained "sufficient control" to qua lify as s tat.u-
tory employers of a n employee of the operator 
pursuant to § 35- 1-42(:l) and the exclus ive 
remedy provis ion of this section appl ied. L:.l.mb 
v. \v-Ene rgy, [nc., 663 F. Supp . 395 (0 . Utah 
1987). 
S ubcontractor's e mployee. 
Subcontractor's employee could not recover 
from ge neral contractor in civil action fo r inju-
r ies on theory t hat subcontractor was his em-
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; 1" :: l!f.L !!enerai cont,ractor was a third pe r-
j". In lhe same employment. Smith v. AI-
L,:'own Co .. 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 
J ~ ~t'lion does not forbid or render invalid 
.:1I~t: in a cons truction subcontract by which 
.. uuCIJ ntractor agreed to indemnify t he 
.. ::": contractor and save him harmless fo r all 
Ill. ', a n sinl! out of the inju ry or death of nn 
·JO · .. . .:e or ."iubcomractor, where such cla use 
. _,' 0 Li no decedent workman 's administra -
': :::.uea prime contractor for wron!--rful deuth 
:ieceden t a nd recovered: therefore, dece-
.m s employer is reqUIred to reimburse prime 
.:LTac tor covered by workmen's compensation 
ro vi ried in such indemni ty clause. Titan 
"' -( Cor!). v. Walt.on. 365 F.2d 542 (lOth Ci r. 
:51. 
~~ liaoiiity of employer. 
,, ·_~ u ~u capacity" doctrine. 
~a n law does not recognize as an excep tion 
trH! e:~cius ive remedy provisions of the 
·.lrke r·s i..:ompensation Act. the so·ca lled 
~;;.J.i capac ILY " doctr ine under which a n em· 
.0,\'1:1'. Silic ided from tor t liability by t he act. 
~ ' av neeo me liab le in to rt if he occupies, in ad-
' ll u on W il is capaci ty as empioyer, a second ca· 
paci ty: thai confers on him an ob ligation inde· 
pendent of lhose imposed on h im as an em· 
player. Worthen v . Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d 
856 £lOth Cir. 19851. 
An employee cannot hold his employer liab le 
in tort for injuries resulting from the em· 
ployer's maintena nce of unsafe premises, on 
the reasonin):! that the employer occupies a sep-
arate capacity a nd owes sepa rate duties to h is 
em ployees as a n owner of the premises, since 
the employe r's duty to maintain a safe wo rk-
place , is inseparable from the employer's gen· 
eral duties as a n employer towa rd his em-
ployees. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 
678 (Utah 1985). 
The dual capacity doctrine did not ap ply to a 
products liability cia im brought on behalf of a 
decedent who was Kill ed whe n he was puil ed 
into a large screw·auger manufactured by de· 
fenda nt while decedent was working on hi s em-
ployer 's premises, where the employer had not 
8!;sumed a separate a nd di stinct obligation to· 
wa rd his e mployee othe r tha n as employer. 
Stewart v. Cr..ll Corp .. 740 P.2d 134U (Utah 
19871. 
Cited in S mith v. Atlan lic Richfield Co. , 814 
F.2d 1481 (10th CiL (987). 
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.~ fllte ImmunlLv fro m Dis trict Suit: Bishop v. 
,-.j ip. isen, 1982 -S .Y.U.L. Rev. 429. 
C . .i .S . - iOl C.J.S. Workmen 's Compensa· 
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A,L,;t_ - Insured 's receipt 01 or ri ght to 
workmen 's compensation beneflls us atTect ing 
recovery under accide nt. hospital, or medical 
expense po licy, 40 A.L.R.3d 1012. 
Workers' compensa tion law us precluding 
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Repeals_ - Section 35-1-61 (C. 1943, Supp ., 
42·1·57·10. enacted by L. 1945. ch. 65, § 2), 
relating to injuries to or death of illega lly em· 
employee's suit aga inst employer for thi rd per-
son'S' crimina l a ttack , 49 A.L.R.4th 926. 
Wo rkers' compensation act as precluding 
tort action for injury to or death of employee's 
unborn child , 55 A.L.R.-Hh 792. 
Wi ll ful. wanton, or reck less conduct of coem-
ployee as grou nd of liabil ity despite ba r of 
workers' compensation law. 57 A.L.R.4th 88S. 
Key Numbers. - Workers' Compensa tion 
c=> 2084. 
played minor, was repealed by Laws 1971, eh , 
76. § 11. 
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:~;"j-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per· 
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer - Rights of empioyer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action - Mainte-
nance of action - Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party - Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer r elationship -
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When a ny injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
utle shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
: han an employer, officer . agen t, or employee of said employer, the injured 
·r np loyee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
" !J ured. empioyee or his heirs or personal repr esentative may also have an 
.:cLion for damages against such third person . If compensation is claimed a nd 
, I(: e mployer Of insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation. the 
"r nlJ loyer or insurance carrier shall become t rustee of the cause of action 
. :~ <li n s t the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
,,·,v n name or in the name of the injured empioyee, or his heirs or the personal 
("I 'p resentative of t he deceased, provided t he employer or carrier may not 
,·u .. ie a nd release the cause of action without t he co nsent of the commission. 
! ;(!I()re proceeding against the t hird party, the injured employee, or. in case of 
fh~ :tl,h , his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to th e carrier or 
·11. il e r' person obligated for t he compensation payments , in order to give such 
:j l ~ r:-;on a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceedin g. 
For t he purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
I j f)n ;~!)-1-42 , the injured employee or his heirs or persona l representative may 
;d s(I maintain an action for damages agai nst subcontractors . general contrac-
I fl r s, independent contractors, property owners or thei r ie33ees or H3signs. not 
·, !"\:upy ing a n employee-employer relationship with th e lnjul'ed 0 1' deceased 
j·r llployee at the time of his injury or death. 
I f" any recovery is obtained against such third person it -,ha ll be di5bursed as 
lollows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the actio n, incluci ing at torneys ' fees , 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the partie, as their 
inte rests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to t he e:::!J loyer or carn er 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured e",,,ioyee or. in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery hac aga in" the third 
party . 
(2) The person li able fo r compensation payments ,"ail be ,e!mouroed 
in full for a ll payments made less the proportionat~ ,:,are c·f , 05t5 and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection ( ll. 
(3) The balance sha ll be paid to t he injured empio \'ee or ~-" heirs in 
case of death , to be a pplied to reduce or satisfy in ~~ :J a n ,.- :· :'iigation 
t hereafter accrui ng against the person liable for cC' :::;,en32:: J :l. 
Itis lllry : L. 1917. ch. 100. ~ 72; C.L. 1917. 
" :1 1:1:1; L. 192 1. c h . 100. j 1; R.S. 193:1. 
1:!. I-fiH: L. 19:19, c h . 5 1, § 1; C. 19<13.42-1-58; 
L. 1945. c h . 65. ~ 1: : ':,71. co.. 7" -3. 
c h. 67. § 7; 1975. ch. » 1. .: 3 . 
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85-1-62 LAIJOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
85-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent. or em-
ployee of said employer - Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action - Mainte-
nance of action - Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party - Right to maintain action 
n ot involving employee-employer relationship -
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under thi s 
ti tle shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer , agent. or employee of said employer. the injured 
;'mpioyee , or in case of death his dependents. may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
~ction for damae;es against such third person . If compensation is claimed and 
~e empioyer or insurance carrier becomes obli gated to pay compensation. the 
-:.mpio,ver or insurance carrier shall become trustee of t he cause of action 
.lgainst the third party and may bring and ma intain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee. or his heirs or the personal 
(2presentative of the deceased . provided the employer or carrier may not 
~ettle a nd release the cause of action without the consent of the commission . 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee , or, in case of 
death. his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to t.he carrier or 
other person obligated for t he compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter a n appearance in the proceeding. 
For t he purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
a lso maintain an action for damages against subcontractors. general contrac~ 
tors. independent contractors, property owners or t heir lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee~employer relations hip with t he injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of t he action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proport ionately against the parties as thei r 
inter ests may appear. Any such fee cha rgeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against t he third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection ( 1). 
(3) The ba lance s hall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any ob ligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
History: L. 1917. c h . IOO. ~ 72: C.L. 1917. L. 1945. ch. 65, ~ 1: 197 1, ch. 76. ~ 3: 1973. 
, 3 133; L. 1921. c h. 100. ! I ; R.S. 1933. ch. 67. ! 7; 1975, c h. 101, ! 3. 
42.1-58: L. 1939. ch. 51. ~ 1; C. 1943. 42·1·58; 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
A NALYS IS 
:'1l1 n~!amSL lort-feasor prior to compensation award. 
iC:.l0 iiity of section. 
~'-! niTIl:!nt of ca use of action . 
. ,l fU CLl on of statute. 
j al'J a ttorney fees. 
. ursement of recove ry . 
.. 'o iea l expenses. 
;Ja i capacity" doctrine. 
~ .. ;ction of remedies. 
~entional injury by fellow employee. 
lnt venture. 
':«iencndenl heirs. 
"·1Oln2'<;. 
- _ ·",,:;l:Jun;ement. 
_ . " moensat lon. 
'CY'.'J ernrHoymen t. 
, ~;{!mellls. 
'?roval 01' commission . 
:te imjuram:e fund. 
. .;r')Q'2tlOn. 
;':l ii~.pa rt )' liability. 
.;:U. 
. \ ction aga ins t tort-feasor peior to compe n-
.~a tion a ward. 
? ,>.ct t hat workmen 's compensation cl.:timant 
-,mi~d wit h th ird·party tort· feaso r for sum 
-J.rger tha n any compensatio n award she could 
~ ave recf::ived. before filing compensation 
·jaim. uici not relieve compensation insurer of 
':uty to pay claimant award renecting ils pro· 
,rtlonatc ::oha re of a ttorney's fees. Grnham v. 
.[l(jURtnal Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 424, 491 P.2d 
223 (U)71 1. 
.-\.ppiicabi lily o i sec tion. 
This section applies onl y to suits against 
tortfeasors who are not employers or deemed to 
be statutory employers. Lamb v. \v·Energy, 
Inc. , 003 F. S upp. 395 (D. Utah 1987>. 
AssiVlment of cau se o f action . 
[f 'action had been commenced against a 
third pe rson Lo recover for t he inju r ies or death 
of applicant, suc h action must ti rst have been 
assigned to stale insu rance fu nd as a cond itio n 
precedent to app licat ion under Workme n's 
Compensa ti un Act. Robinson v. Industr ial 
Comm'n, 72 Uta h 203, 269 P. 513 (1928 l. 
Where employee was ki lled in course of his 
employment by wrongful act of third person , 
and widow chose to claim compensat ion under 
the Workmen's Compensa tion Act. but her 
minor ch ild chose to sue u nder former section , 
' n which actio n widow decl ined to join. as as-
R i gnm~nt of cause of action by widow to em· 
playe r was sutTIcient; a n assignment by the 
minor was not necessary. An assignment was 
necessary only whe n compen~a tion was 
claimed from the employer or his insura nce 
carrier. Brainard's Cottonwood Oairv v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 80 Utah 159. 14 P.2d 212, 88 
A.L.R. 659 (1935). 
It was a condition precedent to the em-
ployee's right to cla im compensation from his 
employer. where he was injured by neg ligence 
of someone not, his employe r , that he shou ld 
assi g-n hi s action fo r dama[{es aga inst the 
wrongdoer. Industrial Comm'n v . Wasatch 
Grading Co., 80 Uta h 223. 14 P.2d 988 (1932 ). 
Cons truc tio n o f s t a tute. 
This sec tion covers both active and pass ive 
negligence. Johanson v. Cudahy Pac king Co .. 
107 Utah 114. 152 P.2d 98 (1944 1. 
Where s tate insurance fund paid compensa· 
tion to injured person. the insurance carrier 
h:1S a cause of ac tion where t,he inj ury was 
caused by thi rd person: but this does not mean 
tha t it had the only cause of action s ince this 
section also gives the inju red pe rson a cause of 
action agai ns t the t hird pe rson . Rog:alski v. 
Phi ll ips Petro leum Co .. 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 
P.2d 304 (19551. 
Co s ts and a tto rney fees. 
State supreme court decisions that permit 
reasonable attorney fees to be deducted from 
t hat por t,ion of recovery ga ined to rei mburse 
sta te insurance fu nd do not apply retroactively 
to fees determined ' " re liance on the fo rme r 
ru le. Draper v. T ravelers Ins. Co., ~29 F.2d 44 
(10th Cir. (970); Willia ms v. Uta h Stale Dep't 
of Fin .. 23 Utah 2d ·138. 464 P.2d 596 (19701. 
Althoug h insurer was en t itled to reimbu rse-
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:-,~ ~ nt o( pnyment made to in.JU red ernpif)yee 
"no subseuuendy recoverpd from third oar ty, 
<: '4 unuble cf)nsideratinns reqUIred it to pay its 
. ..:·roportJf)nare s hare or a ttorney 's fe es inCllrrt!d 
!.: '/ in jured employee in obtai ning J ud~ment 
.,,::unSl t h ird party. Worthen v. Shurtielf & 
.\nll rc w:<) , inc .. 19 Utah 2d 80. 4:~G P.2d 22:1 
i )li7l , 
'i tate insu rance fund iWorken;' Compcnsa · 
:: In F\lnd) wm. required to hear it:; oro rata 
·nare 01 reasonable attorney fees incurred bv 
cla imant in ubtaining settlement with th ird 
pa rty inasmuch as defendant insurance fu nd 
was relieved from burden of payi ng award to 
cla imant. Prettyman v. Uta h State Dep't of 
;;in .. 27 Utah :!d 3:13. 496 P.2d R9 (1 972), 
;.\"here nn iniured pp. rson wno has coll ected 
.;nrKmen·s comoensation sues tilird-na rty tor t-
:-~3sor. both the in jured Derson and the subro-
:~lI.p.d msurn m:e carner bear Lne ir proport ion-
.. '"~ ," lIarc 01 costs and attornev fees incurreJ III 
,.] t.'l im mz recoverv in tort .'mit. Lam!Uaq-e 
": ~ !ea to ::::ubdiv is ion ( 2) bY the 1971 amend-
:':Cll! was intended to elirni nate urior unce r-
t;'lInty nnd make it clear thai:. insu rer should 
~·~n r it3 n:"'o ]:lOrtion.:ne sha re, a nli insure r can-
dO L avoiJ its snare or expenseS by iu ring' its 
own counse l a nli notifying inj ured person of 
lhat fact. La nier v. Pyne, :l9 Utah ~d 249, 508 
P.2d :J8 ( [973). 
Disbursement of recovery . 
- i''l edical expe nses. 
Commission properly intp.rpreted the phrase 
"a ny obl ig'ulion" in Subsection (3 ) to indude 
r.lcd ical expenses. TJ.ylor v. Ir.rlustria l 
(""Jm m'n. 7~~ P.2rl 1183 {Utah 19R71. 
" :::) ual cap:l.c ity·' doctrine. 
Lilah iaw does not recogn ize as a n e.-..:ception 
to the exclus ive remed y provisions Ilf Lhe 
Workers' Compensa tion Act the so-called "dua l 
capacity" doctrine under which an employer , 
shielded from tort liability by t he aCL. may be-
come liable in tort if he occupies. in addition tn 
his capacity as employer, a second crt pacity 
that con fe rs on h im a n obligation independenL 
cd" t hose imposed on him as an employer , 
Worthen V. Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d 856 
( (Oth ei r . (985). 
An employee cannot held hi s employer li a ble 
in to rt for injurips resuiting from t he e m-
ployer's mai ntenance of u nsafe premises, on 
Ihe reason ing that the employe r occupIes a sep-
a ra te capacity and owes sepa rate duties to h is 
employees as a n owner of the premises, !'Iince 
the employer's duty to mainta in a safe work 
place is inseparable f}"nm the employer's ge n-
..-ral duties as a n employe r towa rd his em-
ployees, Bingham V. Lagoon Corp. , 707 P.2d 
678 ilhah (985 ). 
Electio n of r e medies, 
\vh~ re city pn liceman was Iniured by third 
persoll. :.m d city paid policeman compensatIOn 
in fl'l r m of w:tl{es. act ion by po liceman aga inst 
th ird person which was dismissed wi tho ut prej-
ud ice, commenced prior to ass ignment of cause 
of actio n to city, was not an election so as to ba r 
policema n's subsequent claim for compensa-
lion from city. Salt Lake City V. Ind ustrial 
Comm 'n,lH Utah 213, . 17 P.2d 239 0982l. 
Employee of rai lroad was not precluded from 
filin!t claim for compensation by application 
filed under r'edera l Employers ' Liabili ty Act 
on grou nd of election since emplovee did not 
have t wo remedies but only one; if injury was 
incurred while he was engaged in interstate 
commerce his remedy was u nder Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act: if not. it was under state 
act. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. V. Industrtal 
Comm'n. 84 Utah 364. :1 5 P.2d 842, 94 A.L.R. 
[4"3 ( 193~) . 
in a case in which fireman was killed by col-
lapse of a ladder wh ile in the performance of 
his duty, his depe ndents could exercise thei r 
rig-h l to elect under terms of this section to pu r-
;-. I te tneir remedy against third-pu rty wronl!-
doer . Hamilton v. Commission of Fin .. lOS 
Utah 5 7·~ . Hi2 P.2d 758 0945). 
Intentional injury by fellow employee. 
One who is injured by the intentional act of a 
fellow employee may seek recovery for dam-
:3ges as Drovided fo r in this section. Bryan v , 
Utah Int'\' 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). 
Joint venture, 
Construction company obtained contract to 
construct divers ion t unnel at dam a nd entel'ed 
into agreement with corporat ion by which t he 
~wo t'l rgan iZ3Lion:; would unite the ir efforts lO 
compietl! such construction a nd share in proliLs 
" r losses I"rom the en terprise. Mine r , hired by 
t he cons truct ion company , who was injured 
while worki ng on the tunnei, and who obta ined 
workmen's compensation benefits. could not 
sue corporation for a lleged negligence of corpo-
rate employees s ince t he two compa nies were 
rega rded as the employing unit. The employees 
of uoth compan ies were engaged in the same 
employment. Cook v, Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 
Uta h 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963 1. 
Nondependent heirs. 
Legislature did not intend to dives t the ri g- hI. 
of he irs to damages under the wrongfu l death 
statute if they a re nondependents and received 
no compensat ion benefits . Ol iveras V . Ca ribou-
Four Corners, Inc .. 598 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1979). 
Plead ings. 
Complai nt by assignee should a ll ege pay-
men t. of the award . Johanson V. Cudahy Pack· 
i n~ Co., 101 Utah 219. 120 P.2d 28 1 094 11. 
Complaint was sufficie nt to state a cause of 
action for negligence in act ion by depende nts of 
a truck driver who was kill ed when he backed 
a truck into some high tension electric wires 
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',:.: "';:!iiv<>rim! i.1 load of sal t to defe ndant 
.~ .. m.:z comoany. which salt defendant had or· 
" ,)nJ ueceased's employer. J oha nson v. 
~U": t":lC kin~ Co., 107 Utah 114. 152 P .2d 
.' !·I l. 
:m uu rscment. 
'.:1:" \ll ~ urance fund (Workers' Compensa· 
" " IIntill S enti tl ed to he re imbursed not on ly 
···!1:1l. /lW; been paid to the injured employee 
• R t!me 0\ the trial. but also lor any acid i· 
;1;11 sum that it was leg-ally obligated to pay. 
' '.l:i lrlai Comm'n v. Wasatch Grading Co. , 80 
.' !1 :::!2:J. 14 P .2d 988 (1932). 
iured employee's settleme nt and release 
!"\ !1is orivate insurance carrie r . under unin-
:':r:. motorist coverage. did not affect cla im of 
,~ In ,;ura nce fund (Workers' Compensation 
:10' a !! ~l1nst thi rd·party tort-feasor and in-
"" 1] emoJOyee was not required to reimburRe 
:-_: \ f0 f wOrKme n's ~ompensaLion Denefit~ paid 
: .lIn. ;::(!utheast Furn. Co. v. Barrett. 24 
.rl ~J :'!-!-. 465 P.2d 346 (19701 . 
.: rcl. Da rlV was nOL t! n litled to have amount 
~:I.:h:mcnt awarded injured employee reduced 
~ rn r) unL or workmen 's compensa ti on bcnelits 
,~~ Ia d) ~m Dioyee; third party's ~unten tio ns 
.~U L emplOyer a160 was negligent. that insur-
.,1~e com pany stood in shoes of employe r and 
'J ll seauentiv that insu rer should not recove r 
. !"!1ou~t of compensatlon paid injured employee 
· H~ci.~d. Texaco, Inc. v. P ruitt, 396 F.2d 237 
. Uth Clf. 1968). 
T he purpose of the right of reimbursement 
",; tabli;;hed oy this section is only to prevent 
:Huhle recovery by the employee or his or her 
·!:lenden::; . • d b tate Ins. Co. v. Bliss. 725 P.2d 
~ :..:~O (lilah 1986). 
- Compe nsatio n. 
"Compensation". within the meaning of t.his 
sect ion . is limited to a mounts claimed by the 
employee or the dependents. Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. Bliss, 725 P.2d 1330 (Utah 1986). 
The fixcd payment made under 
~ 35· i- fi8(2 )( aJ. when it is determined that a 
deceased employee had no dependents. is not 
"compensa ti on" withi n the meaning of thi s sec· 
tio n, and where the decedent's parents s ued t he 
to rt· feaso r and its insurer. the insu rance fund 
cou ld neithp. r invade the pa re nts' recovery nor 
pursue a separate clai m ngain!'.t the insurer in 
order to recover the amount paid into the Sec· 
ond Injury Fund. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bli ss, 725 
P.2d 1330 (Utah 1986). 
Same e mploy me nt. 
Ne ither subcontractor placing t imbers in 
dome of large build ing no r materialmen s up-
plyi n ~ scaffolding for use in construction was 
en1.!a~ed "i n the same employment"' as em· 
IJiflyee of general construction contractor fo r 
!)uild ing within meaning of this .<:ecl ion. Peter-
son v. Fowler. 27 Uta h 2d 159. 49:1 P.2d 997 
(l972 l. 
Employee of electrical s ubco ntractor was "in 
the sa me employment" as general contracto r 
and not entitled to mai nta in actIOn under this 
sectIOn where general cuntra:.:tor maintained 
ri gnt to s upervi s ion or con trol over subcontrac-
tor by supervising overall continuity and inte-
h'Tation of work among various su bcontractors, 
directi ng the sequence of work by the subcon· 
t ractors. making changes In the work done by 
the m a nd ordering work stoppa~es; decedent's 
only remedy was under Workmen's Compensa· 
tion Act. Adamson v. Okland Constr. Co., 29 
Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973l. 
Where decedent employee of general co ntrac-
to r was electrocuted. allegedl y throu~h negli-
gence of subcontractor , lf1 accident occurr ing 
prior to 1975 amendment of this sec tion. sub-
contractor was in same employment as dece· 
dent under ~ 35·1·42. and hei rs we re pre· 
ciudcd from maintllining wron~ul death ac-
iion aga inst it by provis ions of § 15·1·60. 
Shupe v. Wasatch Elec. Co .. 546 P.2d 896 
(utah 1976l. 
Where plaintiffs decedent and a nother were 
fdlow employees at time of accident, thi s sec-
tion prohibi ted a~ tion oy plai nt.iff agai nst the 
fe ll ow employee a nd similarly prohibited the 
defendant from joining the fell ow employee as 
a joint tort·feasor fo r purposes of contribution . 
Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 1 Utah 
1980). 
Settleme nts . 
-Approval of commission. 
This section does not requi re thllt the com-
miss ion app ro\'e E'mployee·imtiated settle· 
ments. The commiSSion is required to approve 
employer ·init iated se ttiements in orde r to pro-
tect the interest of t.he employee a nd prevent 
the employer from entering into a settleme nt 
that places the employer's welfare abo\'e that 
of the employee. That concern is not present 
when it is t.he employee who settles the s uit. 
Tador v. lndustria l Comm'n. ; ·13 r .2d 1183 
(Utah 19871. 
State insurance fund. 
State insurance fund (Workers' Compensa· 
tion Fund) had no right to recover fo r compen· 
sation benefits paid out of that part of a wrong-
fu l death recovery due to heirs who had re-
ceived no workme n's compensation benelits. 
Oliveras v. Car ibo u· Four Corners. I n~ .. 598 
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1979\. 
Suhrogatio n . 
Where employee's ori gina l injury was aggra· 
vated by physician's mal practice, insu rance 
~arrie r was subrogated to employee's action 
against the physician: but if a greater amou nt 
was recovered than that pa id employee in com· 
pensat ion. the employee was en ti tled to it. 
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!1 J.ker v. Wycoff. 95 Utah 199, 79 P.2d 77 
,l9381. 
Third-party liability. 
Fact that defendant owned ore stockpi le did 
cot mc.ke defrmdant a possessor of the land and 
I hereby 1 iahl e as third party under this section 
fo r d-2ath of contractor's I;'!mployee caused by 
'lnsafe condition of stockpi le. Stevens v. Colo-
f:ldo Fuel & Iron. 24 Vtuh 2d 214. 469 P.2d 3 
, 1970), 
Employee of a masonry subcontracto r whose 
work was subiect to the con~ru! of the general 
contractor was an employee of g'enerai contrac-
t.or fo r purposes of this section and was not en-
titled to recover in tort 8£!"ai nst the ,lreneral 
contractor. Sm ith v. Alfred Brown Co .. 27 Utah 
2d 155. 493 P.2d 994 11972l. 
Cited in Smith' v. Atlantic Richtield Co .. 814 
F.2d 1481 ( 10th Cir. 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa· 
tion * 983 et seq. 
.\.L.R. - Uninsured motorist coverage: va-
lidity and etfect of policy provision purportinq-
to reduce cove ra'{e by amount paid under 
',':orkmen's compensation law. 24 A . L.R.~~d 
1369. 
Right to maintain malpractice suit against 
!njured employee's attending phYRician not· 
withstanding receipt or" workmen 's compensa-
tion award. 28 A.L.R.3d 1066. 
Key Numbers. - Wo rkers' Compensation 
<::=> ~158. 
::5-1-63. Judgments in favor of commission - Preference. 
:\ll judgments obtained in any action prosecuted by the commission or by 
the state under the authority of this tit le shall have the same preference 
against t he assets of the employer as claims for taxes, 
History: L. 1917. ch. 100, ~ 74; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3135; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42- 1·59. 
NOTES TO DECISIO NS 
~·::ctent of preierence. 
;udgmem meeting requirements of this sec-
tion is only given a preference equal to the 
preference of tax claims in distribut ion of as-
sets and is not given same status as a tax lien: 
accordingly. jud~ment of Industrial Commis-
sion lor insu rance premium is not t'ntitled to 
be paid out or" proceeds of sale of mortgaged 
real estate ahead of prior mortgagee . Local Re-
alty Co. v. Steele. 90 Utah 468, 62 P.2d 558 
(1936). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 100 C.J .S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. - Workers' Compensation 
tion § 638. 9 1765. 
35-1-64. Compensation - None for first three days after 
injury unless disability extended. 
No compensation shall be allowed for the first three days after the injury is 
received, except the disbursements hereinafter authorized for medical. nurse 
and hospital services, and for medicines and funera l expenses, provided, how-
ever, if the period of total temporary disability lasts more tha n fourteen days, 
compensation shall also be payable for the first three days after the injury is 
received. 
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·.L COMMISSIO N 
l id period does not r emedy such de-
vided in this section and the court is 
nd a temporary injunction restrain-
'er's business. 
~ent. effective Aoril 24. 1989, substituted "30 
.lys" fo r "90 days" In Subsections (1)(a). (b). 
l d (e); substi t uted "chapter" for "act" in the 
:st sentence of Subsection (2); designa ted the 
rmer second paragrapn in Subsection (2) as 
lhsection (3); and made minor s tylistic 
langes. 
CISIONS 
sura nee a~ent absco nded with the employer 's 
emium a nd fa il ed to arrange for a policy. 
lomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus trial Camm'n 
o P.2d 125 (Utah 1989), ' 
.FERENCES 
Pre-e mption by Longshore a nd Harbor 
orke rs' Compensation Act (33 uses §§ 901 
s,eq.i of s tate law claims for bad-faith dealing 
, Insu rer or agent of insurer , 90 A. L.R. Fed. 
'3. 
for violation - Notice of 
:lOf required - Admissible 
prosecution. 
FERENCES 
t6. relating to payments out of t he Worke rs' 
,mpe nsation Fund. effective April 23, 1990. 
.; 
, 
i 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-60 
'5-1-59. Docketing awards in district court 
judgment. 
E nforcin15 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
j n insured Employers' Fund. 
Commission's order fi nding ~n uninsured 
. :mployer liable for benefits paid to a n injured 
"tnployee by the Uninsured Employe rs' Fund 
"/8S alfirmed with the direction that the fund 
would have Lo seek satisfacllon of the em-
ployer's obligation througn proceeciine;s In tne 
distri ct. court under this sec tlon. l'homas A . 
Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 770 P.2d 
125 (Utah [989>. 
' 0.3-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or DIncer, 
agent or empioyee - OccuDational disease ex-
cepted. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
~ xclusivene::;s of remedy. 
,"cderal law. 
.ndemn ification agreement between employer 
and lhi rd party. 
:n tentionai tort. 
:!tatutory employer. 
Zxclusive ness of remedy. 
Former cou nt.y employee's claims against the 
"ounty or agai nst individual co-employees 
Alsed on negligent infliction of emotional dis· 
;'uss or otherwise based u pon neglige nce we re 
,'3rred by Lhe exclusive re medy provision of 
tilis section. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 
'-. Supp. 381 !D. Utah 1 9~0). 
r'edera1 law, 
Federal government em ployee was barred 
from bringi ng negligence suit. agai nst a fe llow 
employee where, under federal la w, the em· 
?ioyee's exclusive remedy was agai nst the 
iJnited States and she had li led for and re· 
ce ived benefits from t he Uni ted States govern· 
ment. Hope v. Berrett, 756 P .2d 102 (U tah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Indemnification agreeme nt b etwee n e m· 
p loyer and third party. 
The exclus ive remedy provis ion of this sec· 
tion ba rs a claim by a third party that a statu· 
tory employer impliedly agreed to indemnify 
t he t hird pa rt.y aga inst claims for injuries s us · 
tained by a n emp loyee. Freund v. Utah Power 
& Light Co., 793 P .2d 362 (Utah 1990). 
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). cert . granted. 
Mou nteer v. Uta h Power & Light Co .. 7i3 P.2d 
4U5 (Utah Ct . App. 19891. 
Requiring un injured employee to show that 
his employe r or fellow employee manifested a 
deliberate intent. t.o injure him before ai lowine 
a n exception to the statut.e for a n tntentional 
tort is fully consistent wit.h the purpo;;e of the 
workers' compensat.ion act. Knowl edge to a 
substantial certainty that injury will follow is 
not su tTIcient to invoke t he exception. Lantz \' . 
National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 93 i 
(Utah Ct. App. 19891. 
S tatutory employer . 
The legislature has, in clear and unmistak-
able language, evinced an intention to allow 
suits by an injured worker against those per· 
sons who might be h is or her statU lory .am· 
ployers as defined in § 35·1 ·42. The immedi · 
ate. or common-law. employer , who actually 
pays compensa ti on. and it s ot1i!;crs. agents. 
and employees are shielded by the exclusive 
remedy immunity conferred by this sec t ion. 
Pa te v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428 
(Utah 1989). 
The dec ision in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co .. 
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 19891. holding that the 
state Wo rkers' Compensation Act should no 
longe r be construed to provide tort immunity 
to statutory employers who have not been reo 
quired to pay benefits t hereunder to the in · 
jured worker, shou ld be given retroactive ef-
fect. Lamb v. \v·Energy, Inc. , 884 F.2d 13 .. 9 
Intentional tort. (lOth Ci r . 19891 (reversing Lamb v. \v-Energy, 
An employee who, in t he course and scope of Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 198i1. wh ich 
h is or her employment, intentionally act s to a ppears under this catch line in bound volume !. 
injure a co-worker is not protected by the ex· A worker can sue a statutory emp loyer who 
d usivity provis ion from a se parate action at has not been required to pay wo rkers' co mpen-
law fo r damages. But, in such a case. the em· sation benefits. and the latter IS no t protected 
player is li ab le only to t he extent or workers' by the immunit.y a1Torded by this secu on. 
compensation benefits unl ess the injurious act Bosch v. Busch Development, Inc .. tii P.2d 
was di rected or intended by the employe r . 795 431 (Utah 1989). 
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-35-1-62 LABOR - INDUST RIAL COMMISS ION 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
.\.L.R . - "Dual ca pacity doctrine" as bas is 
fo r employee 's recovery fo r medica l mal prac-
tice from company med ical personnel. 73 
A. L.R.4th 11 5. 
Workers' compensation: t hird-pa rty tort lia-
hili ty of cor par a te officer to injured workers . 76 
A. L.R.4th 365. 
Workers' compensation statu te as barring il-
legally employed minor's tort action , 77 
A. L.R.4th 844. 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said emp loyer - Rights of employer or 
insurance carrie r in cause of action - Mainte-
n ance of action - Notice of intention to proceed 
a gainst third party - Right to maintain action 
~ot involving employee-employer relationship -
Disbursement ot proceeds of recovery. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
S tatutory e mployers. 
The legislature has. in clear a nd unmista k-
able language , evinced a n in tention to allow 
su its by a n injured wo rker agains t t hose per-
sons who migh t be his or her statutory em· 
ployers as defi ned in § 35-1-42. The immedi-
a te . or common-law, employer , who actually 
pays compensa tion, a nd its officers, agen ts . 
a nd employees a re shielded by the exclus ive 
remedy immuni Ly conferred by § 35· 1·60. Pa te 
v. Marathon Steel Co. , 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 
1969). 
The decis ion in Pa te v. Ma rat hon Steel Co., 
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989), holdi ng tha t t he 
s tate Workers' Compensation Act should no 
longer be construed to provide tort immuni ty 
to s tatutory employe rs who have not been re-
qu ired to pay benefi ts thereunder to t he in-
j ured worker , should be given retroactive ef· 
fect. Lamb v. W-Energy. Inc. , 884 F.2d 1349 
(lOt h Ci r . 1989 ) (reversing Lam b v. \v· Energy , 
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 to. Utah 1987). which 
appea rs unde r " Applicabili ty of section" catch-
li ne in bou nd. volume ). 
A worker can sue a s ta tutory employer who 
has not been requ ired to pay workers' compen-
sation benefits. a nd t he la tter is not protected 
by the immunity afforded by § 35· 1-60. Bosch 
v. Busch Development . Inc., 777 P.2d 43 1 
(Utah 19691. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Prejudi cial effect of bri ngi ng to 
jury's a ttention fa ct that plain tiff in pe rsona l 
injury or death action is entitled to workers' 
compensation benefi ts. 69 A.L.R.4 t h 131. 
Workers' compensation: th ird-party tort lia-
bility of corporate officer to injured workers, 76 
A.L.RAth 365. 
44 
Workers' compensation: compensabil ity of 
injuries incurred t rave li ng to or from medica l 
treatment of ea rlier compensable injury , 83 
A.L.R. 4th 110. 
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APPENDIX B 
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I 
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I 
I 
~y ~couler and Union Pacific Railroad. Do you have any facts 
~~~t-- you've already told us that you were e~plcyed by 
SC8:Jler. 00 you ~ave any facts that subs~ant~ate ~~e alle-
ga~lcn made by your attorneys that you were eop:oyed by Union 
Pacific Railroad? 
, 
h. No, I don't. 
Q. Paragraph 8 of the complaint, your attcrneys allege 
3 that your accident was caused by Scouler and Union Pacific's 
~ealigence. What facts are you aware of which would support 
~J tha~ allegation? 
~\. I don't know about Union Paci:ic, bu-: Seculer, ',..'hat 
I've said before abou~ t~e way of kicking ~he ~rains, possibly 
the lighting. I think that was it. 
Q. And you excluded Union Pacific, you dcn/~ ~~ow of 
:5 a~y way that--
_0.J 
17 
, 
...... 
Q. 
I don't kncw. ,;0, I don't. 
You indicated to Mr. Williams that you were 
18 receiving workman's cCDpensation benefits as a result of this 
19 accident. That's correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. 00 you still receive those? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. How much do you receive? 
A. $230 a ·,;eek. 
Q. How long have you been receivi:--.g those paj'::',ents? 
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I 
. ~ . since t~e accident . 
1 
- I 
~ , ~ .. Do you kncw how many more ',;eeks those paj'T.',ents ',;il::' 
C! con~inue? 
1 
.'\ . 
Q. 
No, ::: don't. 
Do you understand that they will be C'clt at SCI:'.e 
6 poin~ In time? 
~ ! A. Yes. 
1 
3 Q. You just don't know when? 
j A. I'm not sure when. 
Q. Do you know ',;hat your expenses, r:1edical expenses are 
2S a result of this accident? 
~2 i No. 
Q. Paragraph 6 of your complaint, your attorneys allege 
~edical expenses in excess of $300,000. ~o ~·ou ha~.re any 
IS :'nformation to in any ·~.iay support or substantiate ,::-~a~ clai::1 
'-'.I.. $JOO,OOO? 
17 A. I ~ould jus~ have to checK the ~edical ~ecor=s. 
18 don't know. I don't know how much. 
19 Q. You are receiving those workman's co~pe~sa~lcn 
20 benefits through your employer, Scouler Grain Company, 
21 correct? 
J 22 A. I think it's--Ranger Insurance is who's dOlng it. 
Q . Right. I represent to you that they are the insurer 
.. for Scouler Grain. 
25 A. Okay, yes. 
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-
Q. 3ut it is Ranger insurance that ~s p~8v~jing you ~~e 
·,,'ork .. "'7:an I S co;npensation benef its? 
...... . Yes . 
" 
JJ 
Q. You actually get a check that says Rangec Insurance? 
A. Yes. 
JI Q. Well, ~hat I'd like you to do ~s take ~e ~~rDugh 
everything you can remember, from the ti~e yeu ~ere laying 
.. 
3 there after the train stopped until the ti~e you gct to the 
hosnital. 
-
J A. I just re~ember that Wassim found ~e and ~e r3~ to 
ge~ an 2nbulance, and ~~en just before t~e a~bula~ce ar~~ved ~ 
tunch of other people, other Seculer employees, _ ~~~nk, ra~ 
up to see if they cculd help. Then the a~bulance arrived and 
they took me out of there. And then--but then they had to fly 
~e ~ith the helicopter once they got me to the hospital, they 
~lew me to another hospital. 
Q. 00 you renencer naking any stateDents tc anyone 
18 about how the accident occurred during that tl~e perlod that 
19 you just described? 
20 A. I don't remeDber ',.;hat I said. 
21 Q. Do you re~ernber talking at all to Wassi~? 
A. I rerne~~er h~~ being there, but I don't rerne~~er ,-
23 I said anythlng to him. 
Q. We directed some interrogatories, questions tc you, 
25 and I assume you helped answer those. Do you remember a 
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APPENDIX C 
Letter from Ranger Insurance Company 
Christensen, Jensen and Powell 
~10 Clark Learning Building 
1~5 S'" Tenple 
531-:. L~%e City, CT n 1 ~ i-- , U"-t-'-U.1 
L. Rich i-~ur:tp~'1crys 
:< 2 : C ~ a i rn LJ 0.: ~ 8 8 2 .~ 1 
December l~ r) 
Style: Sullivan vs Scoular, et al 
Date of Accldent: 10-i/-or) 
Dear Hr. HUl.lpherys: 
rhiec file 
1-:'~1ve not 
~:;cpter:'.ber 
cane through on 
been appeased 
of 1'139. 
routine diary, and 
of de'/elop~nents 
Please provide us w1th a short status report cove r i ~1g 
tor t::: i -':i: iJ.:~j/ rlO-:' this case 
developments. 
1S p::-ese:ltly set 
The E\2nger- Insurance Cc;:'.t=·J.!1Y is still ~H:"c·.r~_:~:lJ ,,~:::~·:-:;~s' 
compensation benefits to l·jr. Sullivan and i1~ve paid up~roxi~(ltely 
$215,201 in medical ~it~l $GO,3G9 i:1 weekly injc~~it~· p~l~·~~~t~. 
Should you need anj·thl;-'lg :rc~ cur ;·.'or~:ers I Cc:---.;:er'.sClt:C~-: l: i=-2, 
ple~lse ad\'ise. 
We are looking for~ard to this S!1crt status ~e~crt. 
~I3G/rd 
Yours tr'...ll::·, 
.. ~ "+v-. ( 
c '- - .' 
John B. 
CICliT:1s 
- ._----------------------
